Introduction
Since the attacks on September 11, and the intentional release of Bacillus anthracis through the United States Postal Service, the nation's public health system has been on heightened alert for other potential acts of terrorism. Public health agencies across the country have taken the necessary action to notify health care providers to be on the alert for any possible unusual disease occurrence or increased numbers of illness that might be associated with biologic agents.
In Virginia, the health department is working closely with hospitals to monitor the volume of patient encounters and the occurrence of specific disease syndromes. We are looking at naturally occurring illnesses and any other reports of unusual or ill-defined clinical presentations.
In the absence of adequate measures to predict or prevent acts of terrorism, early detection is critical to minimizing the consequences related to the deliberate release of a biologic agent. Increased vigilance for the detection of unexplained illnesses and disease clusters is essential. Therefore, it is necessary that health care providers, especially those who may be the first to examine and treat victims, become familiar with the syndromes associated with the critical agents ( eschar usually with surrounding local edema subsequently develops. The syndrome also may include lymphangitis and painful lymphadenopathy.
Plague. Clinical features of pneumonic plague include fever, cough with muco-purulent sputum (gram-negative rods may be seen on gram stain), hemoptysis, and chest pain. A chest radiograph will show evidence of bronchopneumonia.
Botulism. Clinical features include symmetric cranial neuropathies (e.g., ptosis, dysphagia, and dysphasia), blurred vision or diplopia, symmetric descending weakness in a proximal to distal pattern, and respiratory dysfunction from respiratory muscle paralysis or upper airway obstruction without sensory deficits. Inhalational botulism would have a similar clinical presentation as foodborne botulism; however, the gastrointestinal symptoms that accompany foodborne botulism may be absent.
Smallpox (variola). The early acute clinical symptoms of smallpox resemble other acute viral illnesses such as influenza, beginning with a 2 -4 day nonspecific prodrome of fever and myalgias before rash onset. Several clinical features can help clinicians differentiate varicella (chickenpox) from smallpox. The rash of varicella is most prominent on the trunk and develops in successive groups of lesions over several days, resulting in lesions in various stages of development and resolution. In comparison, the vesicular/pustular rash of smallpox is typically most prominent on the face and extremities, and lesions develop at the same time.
Inhalational tularemia. Inhalation of F. tularensis causes an abrupt onset of an acute, nonspecific febrile illness beginning 3 -5 days after exposure, with pleuropneumonitis developing in a substantial proportion of cases during subsequent days.
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Hemorrhagic fever (such as would be caused by Ebola or Marburg viruses). After an incubation period of usually 5 -10 days (range: 2 -19 days), illness is characterized by abrupt onset of fever, myalgia, and headache. Other signs and symptoms include nausea and vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, chest pain, cough, and pharyngitis. A maculopapular rash, prominent on the trunk, develops in most patients approximately 5 days after onset of illness. Bleeding manifestations, such as petechiae, ecchymoses, and hemorrhages, occur as the disease progresses. 
Front Line Responders

Health-Care Providers
Health-care providers should be alert to illness patterns and diagnostic clues that might indicate a single case of an unusual infectious disease associated with intentional release of a biologic agent and should report any clusters or findings to their local or state health department. Delays in the recognition and subsequent reporting of suspected bioterrorist events could affect the health of many. The covert release of a biologic agent may not have an immediate impact because of the delay between exposure and illness onset, and outbreaks associated with intentional releases might closely resemble naturally occurring outbreaks. Indications of intentional release of a biologic agent include:
1) a large number of persons presenting with clinical signs and symptoms that suggest an infectious disease outbreak (e.g., >2 patients presenting with an unexplained febrile illness associated with sepsis, pneumonia, respiratory failure, or rash, especially if occurring in otherwise healthy persons);
2) an unusual temporal or geographic clustering of illness;
3) an unusual age distribution for common diseases (e.g., an increase in what appears to be a chickenpox-like illness among adult patients, but which might be smallpox); and 4) an unusual pattern of death or illness among animals that precedes or accompanies death or illness in humans.
Clinical Laboratory Personnel
Although unidentified gram-positive bacilli growing on agar may be considered as contaminants and discarded, CDC recommends that these bacilli be treated as a "finding" when they occur in a suspicious clinical situation (e.g., febrile illness in a previously healthy person). The laboratory should attempt to characterize the organism by determining motility, sensitivity to penicillin, absence of hemolysis on sheep blood agar and conducting other appropriate biochemical tests to identify species.
An unusually high number of samples, particularly from the same biologic medium (e.g., blood and stool cultures), may alert laboratory personnel to an outbreak. In addition, central laboratories that receive clinical specimens from several sources should be alert to increases in demand or unusual requests for culturing (e.g., uncommon biologic specimens such as cerebrospinal fluid or pulmonary aspirates).
When collecting or handling clinical specimens, laboratory personnel should: 1) use Biological Safety Level II (BSL-2) or Level III (BSL-3) facilities and practices when working with clinical samples considered potentially infectious;
2) handle all specimens in a BSL-2 laminar flow hood with protective eyewear (e.g., safety glasses or eye shields), use closed-front laboratory coats with cuffed sleeves, and stretch the gloves over the cuffed sleeves;
3) avoid any activity that places persons at risk for infectious exposure, especially activities that might create aerosols or droplet dispersal; 4) decontaminate laboratory benches after each use and dispose of supplies and equipment in proper receptacles; 5) avoid touching mucosal surfaces with their gloved or ungloved hands, and never eat or drink in the laboratory; and 6) remove and dispose of their gloves in a biohazard container, wash their hands, and remove their laboratory coat before leaving the laboratory.
When a laboratory is unable to identify an organism in a clinical specimen, the specimen should be sent to the state laboratory where the agent can be characterized. Any clinical specimens suspected to contain variola virus (smallpox) should be reported to local and state health authorities immediately and then transported to CDC. All variola diagnostics should be conducted at CDC laboratories. 
Infection-Control Professionals
Heightened awareness by infection-control professionals (ICPs) facilitates recognition of the release of a biologic agent. ICPs are involved with many aspects of hospital operations and with counterparts in other hospitals. As a result, ICPs may recognize changing patterns or clusters in a hospital or in a community that might otherwise go unrecognized.
ICPs should ensure that hospitals have current telephone numbers for notification of both internal (ICPs, epidemiologists, infectious diseases specialists, administrators, and public affairs officials) and external (state and local health departments, local police, and other local emergency responders) contacts. 9 ICPs should work with clinical microbiology laboratories that receive specimens for testing from their facility to ensure that cultures from suspicious cases are evaluated appropriately and findings communicated promptly.
Virginia Public Health Response to the Threat of Bioterrorism
Public health has a critical role in bioterrorism preparedness and response that includes surveillance for early detection of unusual patterns of disease occurrence. Over the past two years, the Virginia Department of Health (VDH) has worked to strengthen our disease surveillance capacity and to build partnerships with the health-care community and our colleagues in neighboring state health departments. In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, and the subsequent intentional release of anthrax, the immediate public health action taken was heightened medical surveillance to monitor the occurrence of any unusual disease patterns that might be associated with these events.
While hospitals and other medical care providers statewide were encouraged to be on the highest alert for any signs of unusual disease activity, special medical surveillance projects also have been initiated. These projects involve public health staff working with selected hospital emergency departments (ED) in the northern and tidewater regions to monitor clinical data on all patients. Clinical syndromes (Table 1) are evaluated daily for trends and patterns that could signal an increase in illness consistent with a possible bioterrorist event. We are particularly interested in acute respiratory infections, symptoms of gastroenteritis, acute neurologic illness, rash illness and unexplained deaths. When an increase is detected, public health staff gather additional clinical and epidemiologic information. To date, no infectious disease outbreaks consistent with bioterrorism have been identified through these syndromic surveillance projects. The syndromic surveillance system used since September 11 is not the first time VDH has initiated this type of enhanced medical surveillance for potential acts of bioterrorism. The department's first experience with syndromic surveillance was associated with the 2001 Presidential Inauguration. This project was designed to classify every ED patient visit at three participating hospicontinued from page 2 tals in northern Virginia into one of eight categories using discharge diagnosis data that were analyzed daily. The second project involved conducting enhanced medical surveillance for illnesses around the 2001 Boy Scout Jamboree. Information was collected from two participating hospitals regarding number of admissions and percentage of admissions from EDs, as well as encounters with a Jamboree link. Each project utilized hospital and health department staff to collect the clinical data, monitor the occurrence of specific disease syndromes, and evaluate the volume of patient encounters.
In light of growing concerns for future acts of terrorism and the need to continue to improve our capability of early recognition of unusual disease patterns, there is a need to enhance surveillance. Data collected from 911 calls, hospital admissions, ED visits, intensive care unit admissions, and pharmaceutical records have been identified as potential sources for evaluating the health status of a community. The utility of these data for identifying infectious disease outbreaks is still being evaluated. Electronic linkages to these data could improve surveillance for bioterrorism.
Conclusion
Early recognition of a bioterrorist event is crucial. Any unusual illness or disease clusters should be reported to your local health department. The first indication of the intentional release of a biologic agent may be detected by an astute health care provider. Early detection requires a level of knowledge among health care providers about potential biologic agents.
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